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SOVEREIGNTY IN THE "NEW WORLD
ORDER": THE ONCE AND FUTURE POSITION
OF THE UNITED STATES, A MERLINESQUE
TASK OF QUASI-LEGAL DEFINITION*
William C. Plouffe, Jr.t
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last several decades, the world has experienced numerous
political changes and upheavals. Examples of these include, but are not
limited to: the ongoing Middle East crises, the Vietnam War, the
breakup of two European nations (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), the
Cuban Missile Crisis, the formation of the European Union (formerly
the Common Market), the fall of South African apartheid, the reunifi-
cation of Germany, the Beijing riots, the dissolution of the Soviet Un-
ion and the Warsaw Pact, and the subsequent ending of the Cold War.
In many political events, the United States has been looked to and has
responded as, in varying degrees, a world leader. The apparent reasons
the world looks to the United States as a world leader are its economic
and military strength, but not, as evidenced by its critics, its moral character.'
Despite the acknowledged leadership of the United States, a num-
ber of its recent actions in the area of foreign affairs have caused genu-
* With the most profound apologies to T.H. White for libeling his classic work, THE
ONCE AND FUTURE KING.
t B.A., North Adams State College, summa cum laude, 1980; B.S., Worcester State Col-
lege, summa cum laude, 1981; M.A., University of Massachusetts, 1993; J.D., University of
Tulsa College of Law, with Honors, 1996.
1. See, e.g., William Pfaff, A New and Radical Argument for U.S. Interventions, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 7, 1990, at C3; Charles Burress, Our Pearl Harbor Attack on Panama, NEWSDAY,
July 29, 1990, at 5.
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ine concern to the academic, legal, and political communities, both
national and international. These actions include: (1) the invasion of
Panama and subsequent arrest of General Manuel Noriega, (2) the near-
invasion of Haiti and subsequent ouster of General Raoul Cedras, (3)
the kidnapping and arrest of Dr. Machain-Alvarez from Mexico, (4) the
invasion of Grenada, and (5) the mining of Nicaragua's harbors. Al-
though there are a number of other incidents which could be catego-
rized with these incidents, this paper will limit its scope to those events
listed as some of the more well-known acts by the United States. Other
prominent incidents (e.g., the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Dominican
Republic action, and the overthrow of Allende in Chile in the 1960s)
will not be examined due, in part, to their age.
On September 11, 1990, President George Bush announced to
Congress, the nation, and the world the coming of a "New World Or-
der."' He continued to use the phrase in his subsequent speeches, in-
cluding his address at the United Nations in 1991.' Supposedly funda-
mental to this New World Order was "[a] world where the rule of law
supplants the rule of the jungle .... A world where the strong respect
the rights of the weak."4 The announcement of this New World Order
brought varying responses in academia, media, and politics, foreign and
domestic. Some thought President Bush's phrase alluded to a world
where the United States was the sole authority imposing its own sense
of justice.5 Some (at least the Nicaraguans, after winning in the World
Court against the United States concerning the mining of its harbors)
thought it was a joke.6 Most had no idea what it meant,7 including a
number of United States government officials! Many were never able
to figure it out.9 However, meaning can be gleaned from actions, even
when official policy may state otherwise.'0
2. Mary Curtius, Evoking the Memory of Wilson and 'A New World Order', BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1990, at 14.
3. See William Satire, The New New World Order, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991, §6, at 14.
4. Curtius, supra note 2.
5. What New World Order for the World?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 16, 1990, at
2B.
6. Joel Achenbach, 'New World Order', What's it Mean, Anyway?, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,
1991, at Dl.
7. See William Neikirk, Americans Finding Precious Little New Order in Their World,
Cm. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1991, at 13C.
8. See Don Oberdorfer, Bush's Talk of a 'New World Order': Foreign Policy Tool or
Mere Slogan?, WASH. POST, May 26, 1991, at A31.
9. See Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., Ordering the New World Order, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15,
1992, at 67.
10. See Robin Wright, World View; Old Ways Falling But 'New World Order' is Still
Murky, L.A. TIMEs, June 25, 1991, at 1.
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Was President Bush merely spouting political verbiage for the
consumption of the masses?" Was President Bush announcing to the
world that the United States would assume the role of a benevolent
overseer of world peace? 2 Was he using it to mask United States vio-
lation of another nation's sovereignty, in this case merely to protect oil
supplies from being controlled by a nation outside the sphere of influ-
ence of the United States? 3 Did he "inadvertently" bring to the
public's attention the actual formation and/or existence of a true New
World Order? 4
It should be noted that the phrase "New World Order" is not
unique and has been used numerous times throughout recent history.
President Woodrow Wilson used it in 1918. A Peruvian Finance
Minister used it in 1986.6 Mikhail Gorbachev used it in 1990 just pri-
or to President Bush using it.'
7
Whatever President Bush's intent may have been, many people
seized upon the concept of a New World Order to question the recent
actions of the United States in the area of foreign affairs. Particularly,
the respect the United States may, or may not, have for the sovereignty
of other nations. When these previously listed actions are considered in
conjunction with the announced principle of a New World Order, ema-
nating from the United States, visions of world tyranny come to mind.
Such visions are, fortunately, only given serious consideration by the
ultra-right," or the ultra-left,' 9 depending upon your own particular
perspective.
What is more troubling is that the actions of the United States
appear to be foreshadowing a change of attitude on the part of the
United States towards the sovereignty of other nations. Unless, of
course, either: (1) the change has already occurred or (2) the attitude
has always been present, but masked. Taken individually, each incident
could be legitimately explained as necessary and proper, under those
particular circumstances. However, taken together, these incidents paint
a disturbing picture which leads the rational mind to reconsider the
11. See Oberdorfer, supra note 8.
12. See What New Order for the World? supra note 5.
13. See Next: A New World Order?, NEWSDAY, Mar. 3, 1991, at 31.
14. For an interesting modem discussion of "world order" compare Stanley Hoffman, Re-
ports of the Conference on Conditions of World Order, DAEDALUS, June 22, 1995, at 1, with
Paul W. Schroeder, The New World Order: A Historical Perspective, WASH. Q., Spring 1994,
at 25.
15. See Curtius, supra note 2.
16. See Safire, supra note 3.
17. See id.
18. See Joe Klein, A Plausible Hothead?, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1995, at 45.
19. See Jacob Heilbrunn, The Next Cold War, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 20, 1995, at 27.
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previously and frequently dismissed claims of many of the smaller
and/or socialistic nations regarding the imperialistic practices of the
United States.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Practitioners and students of international law are aware that inter-
national law is a nebulous affair at best. Where, under most domestic
legal systems, enacting (legislature), enforcing (police), and adjudicating
(courts) agencies exist, the international community has only relatively
unsubstantial reflections of these institutions. There is no international
police force;2' there is no international code of law binding all na-
tions;2 there is no effective international legislative body, as resolu-
tions of the United Nations are generally considered non-binding upon
nations;22 and nations can withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice at will' as did the United States when it was
aggrieved at the apparent turn of events before the International Court
of Justice after Nicaragua sued the United States for mining its har-
bors.24 However, what substance there is of international law is univer-
sally acknowledged to arise from four sources: (1) treaties, (2) custom-
ary international law, (3) general principles of law, and (4) the limited
use of judicial decisions and the work of highly qualified publicists.'
International law is commonly divided into two categories: public
international law and private international law. Public international law
encompasses the relations involving states. Private international law
usually focuses upon the economic relationship between private parties
of different nationalities. As this paper addresses the relationship be-
tween the United States and the international community, private inter-
national law will not be considered.
20. INTERPOL is primarily an information gathering and disseminating agency without
traditional police powers.
21. However, the U.N. Charter, as a multi-lateral treaty, ostensibly including all nations,
could be construed as such.
22. See Oscar Schacter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994).
23. Article 36 states in pertinent part:
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ... the jurisdiction of the Court ....
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on
condition of reciprocity ... or for a certain time.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36.
24. See Letter of Secretary of State George P. Schultz to the United Nations, dated October
7, 1985 reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 297
(1991) (notifying the United Nations that the United States was terminating its recognition of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice).
25. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38.
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A. Sovereignty
Sovereignty was not formally recognized in scholarship until the
Sixteenth Century.2 6 However, customary international law is the
source of this most basic principle of international law. Before the
notion of sovereignty can be discussed, the idea of statehood must be
examined, as sovereignty only applies between states.27
A state has been defined as an entity which has a specific territory,
a permanent population, its own government, and the capacity to en-
gage in formal relations with other such entities.2" Given this generally
accepted definition and that the parties to be discussed in this paper are
all members of the United Nations (thus recognizing their status as
states), there is no question that the condition of statehood exists for all
the pertinent parties.
Sovereignty has been equated with the concept of independence,29
especially between sovereign states.3" Sovereign states, by definition,
are free from the authority of other states. This independence is funda-
mental to the principle of sovereign equality of all nations.31
The term "sovereignty" has been subjected to extensive discussion
as to its meaning and manipulation, especially by politicians. Professor
Oppenheim traced the development of the concept of sovereignty since
the Sixteenth Century, acknowledging that sovereignty was considered
to be the "absolute and perpetual power within a State."32 Initially,
sovereignty was not generally recognized as divisible. With the arrival
of the Twentieth Century, it was generally recognized that the necessi-
ties of international peace required the partial relinquishment of sover-
eignty to some form of international authority.33 However, within the
26. See I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 67-70 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed.,
1955)[hereinafter 1 OPPENmEIM].
27. Article 2 states in pertinent part:
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
its members.
Article 4 states in pertinent part:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all... peace-loving
states ....
U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, 4.
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 (1987). The Montevideo
Convention, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
29. See LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (3rd ed., 1979); 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 123.
30. See I OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 123; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 14.
31. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, f 1; BROWNLE, supra note 29, at 287, 1 OPPENHEIM, supra
note 26, § 115.
32. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, §§ 67-70.
33. Id. § 67.
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ambit of relations between nations themselves, sovereignty with respect
to other nations has not been diminished.
Oppenheim presented a simplified description of sovereignty as
having two principle elements: territorial sovereignty (dominium) and
personal sovereignty (imperium) 4 Territorial sovereignty is the su-
preme authority over all persons, items, and acts within that state's
territory. Personal sovereignty is supreme authority over all of that
state's citizens, at home and abroad.
In contrast, Brownlie has differentiated "sovereignty" from "juris-
diction" in that sovereignty refers to the status of statehood while juris-
diction refers to the rights and powers of a state over a particular terri-
tory.35 Thus, concerning the division of Germany after World War II,
although Germany, as a nation, had no practical powers or rights (i.e.,
jurisdiction), Germany still had international legal status as a nation
(i.e., sovereignty).36 It should be clearly understood that, according to
Brownlie, jurisdiction can be de jure or de facto. This distinction was
acknowledged by the British House of Lords in a case of extradition
from Israel to Great Britain.37 Although a nation might not have any
legitimate sovereign authority over a territory, it could certainly have
jurisdiction, legitimately or illegitimately. The distinction between de
jure and de facto jurisdiction is an implicit recognition of the presence,
or lack, of legitimate sovereignty.
Comparing Oppenheim and Brownlie, it appears that Brownlie has
acknowledged the political realities of the world while Oppenheim has
not. However, Brownlie's recognition of de facto jurisdiction, as an
element of sovereignty, is not an acknowledgment of de facto jurisdic-
tion as morally or legally legitimate. Indeed, the United Nations Charter
acknowledges the fundamental importance of a state's territorial integri-
ty.
38
Under Brownlie's explanation, the corollaries of sovereignty in-
clude: (1) a prima facie exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and a
permanent population; (2) the duty of non-intervention in the jurisdic-
tions of other sovereign nations; and (3) the duties imposed by treaties
and customary international law.39 Oppenheim strongly acknowledged
the duty of a state NOT to violate the territorial sovereignty of another
state.' Oppenheim, like Brownlie, acknowledged that a state's territo-
34. See id. § 123.
35. See BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 109-10.
36. See id. at ll l.
37. See Schtraks v. Israel [1964 App. Cas. 556.
38. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4.
39. BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 287.
40. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, §§ 125, 127.
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rial sovereignty can be limited by customary international law and trea-
ties.4 1
B. Jurisdiction
Whether or not the reader accepts the idea that jurisdiction is a part
of, or separate from, sovereignty, the fact remains that the two concepts
are so closely intertwined that they cannot be considered separate from
each other in an analysis of sovereignty. For the purpose of analysis, a
violation of jurisdiction constitutes a violation of sovereignty.
Generally, jurisdiction is defined as the legal authority and power
over a party or claim.42 Jurisdiction has been recognized to include
three elements: jurisdiction to prescribe or legislate,43 jurisdiction to
enforce," and jurisdiction to adjudicate.45 Jurisdiction to prescribe
generally denotes the enactment of laws. Jurisdiction to enforce is the
actual executive action taken to induce compliance with the law (i.e.,
the police function). Jurisdiction to adjudicate is the actual determina-
tion of the guilt of the party. It should be noted that some authorities
consider the jurisdictions to adjudicate and enforce as overlapping.
Under international law, five bases for jurisdiction are recognized:
(1) the territorial principle, (2) the nationality principle, (3) the protec-
tive principle, (4) the passive personality principle, and (5) the univer-
sality principle.' For this paper, the concept of territorial jurisdiction
will provide the fundamental framework for the analysis of sovereignty.
1. Territorial Principle
The territorial principle states that the legal system of the nation
where the crime was committed has jurisdiction to address the
matter.47 The territorial principle is considered to be "the indispensable
foundation for the application of... legal rights that a state possess-
es." The strength and importance of territorial sovereignty is illustrat-
41. See id. § 127.
42. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 110; M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 393
(3rd ed., 1991). See generally 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, §§ 143 et seq.; see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (1987).
43. See, e.g., BROWNLE, supra note 29, at 298; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 144; SHAW,
supra note 42, at 397; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1987).
44. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 298; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 144; SHAW,
supra note 42, at 398; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 431 (1987).
45. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 298; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 144; SHAw,
supra note 42, at 399; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 421 (1987).
46. See, e.g., BROWNLEE, supra note 29, at 300-04; SHAw, supra note 42, at 400-11. See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS § 402 (1987).
47. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 300-302; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 143.
48. SHAw, supra note 42, at 400.
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ed by the universally recognized grant of jurisdiction over foreign na-
tionals within a state's borders.49
There are two principles which extend a nation's jurisdiction be-
yond its borders and modify the territorial principle: subjective
territoriality and objective territoriality. Subjective territoriality creates
jurisdiction when the crime was started within the state claiming juris-
diction and was completed elsewhere. Objective territoriality states that
jurisdiction is proper when at least one essential part of the crime has
been committed within a state's territory. The classic example of this is
the firing of a gun across an international border, killing a person.'
The most famous case in the extension of jurisdiction beyond a
nation's territory is The Lotus Case." This case involved the collision
of a French steamer (the Lotus) with a Turkish vessel, causing the loss
of the Turkish vessel and the deaths of a number of Turkish nationals.
After the collision, the French watch officer on duty at the time of the
accident was arrested and charged by Turkish authorities when the
Lotus reached Turkey. The French protested and the Permanent Court
of International Justice ruled that Turkey had not violated international
law because, in part, of the effect of the collision upon Turkish territo-
ry-the Turkish vessel sailing under the Turkish flag was considered
part of Turkish territory." However, the decision in The Lotus Case
has been criticized and, according to one international legal scholar, has
been overruled by the High Seas Convention."
a. The United States and Extra-Territorial Effects
The United States has, much to the chagrin of other nations, at-
tempted to extend its international jurisdiction through the enactment of
domestic laws. A good example of this is The Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.54 Such actions by the United States have prompted numerous
complaints from other nations.5 Even though the United States
49. See id. at 401; see also 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 145.
50. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 300-01; SHAw, supra note 42, at 401.
51. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
52. See BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 302 (reciting the Lotus decision).
53. SHAw, supra note 42, at 403. The High Seas Convention, Apr. 29, 1958, art 11(1), 450
U.N.T.S. 82, 88.
54. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1994).
55. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 24, at 732-33 (citing L. Collins, Blocking and
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amended that Act in 1982 ostensibly to limit its international effect, 6
other laws of the United States have had, in the view of many other
nations, an unacceptable international effect and have prompted strong
criticism."' In contrast, the United States has acquiesced to the ruling
of a foreign court (the United Kingdom) when the court refused to ac-
knowledge the legal force of President Reagan's Executive Orders
freezing the assets of Libya after a series of terrorist attacks.58 How-
ever, whether this was a decision to accommodate a long standing ally
and trading partner in a unique situation or a recognition of the impro-
priety of United States actions under international law is a question for
debate, with the final decision leaning heavily against the latter.
2. Nationality Principle
The nationality principle establishes jurisdiction over a nation's
citizens for acts committed outside the borders of that nation. The
rationale is if each citizen enjoys the rights and protection of their
sovereign state, they must submit to its justice.'
3. Protective Principle
The protective principle permits a national jurisdiction over aliens
who have committed extraterritorial acts that jeopardize the security of
that nation.6 This principle stems from the universally recognized
right of a state to defend itself, codified in the United Nations Char-
ter.62 This principle will also receive examination in this paper under
the rationale of "national security" which has been advanced on more
than one occasion by the United States as justification for its foreign
activities.
a. National Security
"Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of
civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American
Clawback Statutes: The U.K. Approach, 1986 J. Bus. L. 452, 454).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994).
57. See European Communities: Comments on the United States Regulations Concerning
Trade with the U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 891 (1982) (commenting that the actions of the United
States violated, inter alia, the territorial principle).
58. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 26 I.L.M. 1600 (1987).
59. See BROWNLm, supra note 29, at 303.
60. See SHAW, supra note 42, at 403-04.
61. See Id. at 410; See BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 303.
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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Union." 3 But self defense, under the United Nations Charter, is limit-
ed to responding to armed attacks."
However, the concept of "national security" has been recently
defined to include many other factors besides the defense of territorial
borders. For example, it has been recognized by statute that national
security includes protecting United States citizens abroad.65 National
security has also been defined to include access to natural resources,
such as oil, in foreign nations.' Indeed, many Arabs view control of
their oil as fundamental to American policy.67 The national security of
the United States has been argued to include world order, where "[tihe
degree of peril" involving other nations may effect the security of the
United States.' And national security has even, according to some
politicians, included the fostering of "democratic" ideals upon other
nations.'
However self defense and national security are defined, they must
be analyzed with respect to the threat posed. One author lists threats in










The immediacy of the threat must be factored in conjunction with the
degree of danger.7
Ideally, before the reason of "national security" is used to justify
an action, there should be a threat of sufficient immediacy which corre-
sponds to the degree of action taken in response to the "threat" and the
63. Frederick S. Tipson, National Security and the Role of Law, in NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 21 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.41).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
65. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security & Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399,
100 Stat. 853 (1986).
66. See David D. Newsom, America Engulfed, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1981, at 17.
67. See Lisa Beyer, Saddam Hussein as the Lesser of Two Evils, TIME, Oct. 15, 1990, at
54.
68. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Theoretical Approaches to National Security and World Order,
in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 31 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990).
69. See infra part III A & D, for reasons offered by the United States for violating the sov-
ereignty of Haiti and Grenada.
70. Tipson, supra note 63, at 17.
71. See id.
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response must be rational and proportional.72 Further, any response
should be within the boundaries of international law.
4. Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle allows jurisdiction where an act
committed outside the victim's nation harms him, even though the act
may have been legal in the jurisdiction where it was committed. The
most famous case involving this principle is the Cutting Case.3 In
Cutting, a Mexican national was defamed by a United States citizen
who was subsequently arrested and convicted upon entering Mexico.
This principle is not universally recognized, although the United States
has recently used it as a justification for its actions.7 ' The United
States has formally recognized this principle by statute in certain cir-
cumstances, such as hostage taking.75
5. Universality Principle
The universality principle states that jurisdiction is allowed for all
nations, wherever the crime was committed.76 This principle has been
acknowledged to include piracy, hijacking, and war crimes.77 There
has been significant discussion about terrorism being subject to the uni-
versality principle, but it has failed to receive recognition as yet.
a. International Human Rights
In the modem era, some would argue that the issue of international
human rights should be encompassed within the universality principle.
In the United Nations Charter, human rights are recognized as provid-
ing a certain degree of authority for enforcing international human
rights.78 The International Court of Justice has also recognized the
status of international human rights.79 Moreover, numerous conven-
tions and resolutions have been enacted recognizing international human
rights.' °
72. See id. at 21.
73. See e.g. BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 303; SHAW, supra note 42, at 408.
74. See SHAW, supra note 42, at 409 (referring to United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896
(D.D.C.1988)).
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203.
76. See SHAW, supra note 42, at 411; see also BROWNIE, supra note 29, at 304.
77. See SHAw, supra note 42, at 411-14.
78. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
79. See Advisory Opinion on the Presence of South Africa in Namibia 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57
(June 21); Barcelona Traction Case (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32, 512-15 (Feb. 5).
80. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); Convention Against Torture, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985); The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; The Convention on the Rights of the
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Since human rights are a question of international law,"' the prin-
ciple of sovereignty is not necessarily a bar to intervention within an-
other nation's domestic affairs regarding the protection of international
human rights. However, each state must first be allowed an opportunity
to exhaust its domestic remedies.82 Who is to judge when a violation
of human rights justifies intervention? Is this an ex post facto judgment
after an intervention has already occurred? If so, what happens when
the violating nation is powerful and will not recognize the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice (i.e., the United States)?
C. Territorial Sovereignty and The Duty to Other Nations
The United Nations Charter states, inter alia:
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security .... in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law ....
Article 2
The Organization and its Members.. . shall act in accordance with the fol-
lowing Principles.
1 .... the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
83
state ..
Thus, the duty on the part of all nations to respect territorial sovereign-
ty has been codified. This duty has also been recognized as binding
under the principles of customary international law.84
D. The Exceptions
Given the requirement of a specific territory as a precondition for
statehood and sovereignty under international law, territorial sovereignty
is the foundation for any discussion concerning the violation of sover-
Child, 28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989); European Convention for Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 312
U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
81. See SHAW, supra note 42, at 238 (citing Tunis & Morocco Cases 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 4.)
82. See id. at 239.
83. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1 & 2 (emphasis added).
84. See 1 OPPENHEM, supra note 26, §§ 124, 125; see also SHAW, supra note 42, at 278-
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eignty. Although modem social, economic, and political factors (e.g.,
technology, multinational corporations, transboundary environmental
concerns, the United Nations) have apparently reduced the territorial
exclusivity of the modem state, "[tierritorial sovereignty remains as a
key concept in international law.""5 Indeed, a close examination of the
five principles for jurisdiction previously discussed shows that the last
four principles-nationality, protective, passive personality, and univer-
sality' -are mere exceptions to the first principle of territoriality. 7
Territorial sovereignty can also be limited by treaty or customary inter-
national law."8
E. The Right to Use Force
The United Nations Charter guarantees the right of a member
nation to use force in self defense, individually or collectively, if they
are subject to an armed attack. 9 The use of force is inherent in the
principle of national security." The right to use force is, however,
qualified by the mandate that peaceful means must first be exhaust-
ed.9'
These restrictions are mirrored throughout international organiza-
tions. For example, the Organization of American States Charter goes
even further in stating: that "[t]he territory of a State is inviolable; it
may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of
other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on
any grounds whatever."92
When force is used, it must only be used in the event of extreme
necessity. The use of such force must be in proportion to the wrong to
be prevented. These principles have been recognized by the United
States since the time of the Caroline Case in 1837."3 Furthermore,
concern for a nation's sovereignty is the paramount consideration in any
use of force.94
85. SHAW, supra note 42, at 277.
86. See discussion infra part I.B.
87. See discussion infra part I.B.
88. See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 143.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v; U.S.)
1986 I.CJ. 4, 14, 94 (June. 27).
90. See discussion infra part I.B.
91. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
92. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER art. 17.
93. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 24, at 1219-24 (discussing the facts of the
Caroline Case and the subsequent correspondence between the United States and British gov-
ernments).
94. See Oscar Schacter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1645 (1984).
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A number of international legal authorities consider civil strife to
be a purely domestic matter, beyond the purview of international law
and potential intervening nations." However, it has been acknowl-
edged that intervention in such civil disturbances is common in the
modem world." There have also been acknowledgments, in certain




1. The Monroe Doctrine
President James Monroe announced the Monroe Doctrine to Con-
gress on December 2, 1823:
[A] principle in which rights and interests of the United States are involved,
that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which
they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as sub-
jects for future colonization by any European Power .... [W]e should con-
sider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety .... "
The Monroe Doctrine is a formal political statement that the United
States considers itself to be the primary influence within the American
continents. Indeed, Oppenheim acknowledged that the Monroe Doctrine
has since been expanded such that the "United States claims a kind of
political hegemony over all the States of the American continent."
This expansion was proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1905, when
he stated that the Monroe Doctrine permits the "right of unilateral inter-
vention in Latin America to maintain order."1" However, even though
Oppenheim stated that the Monroe Doctrine is a political, as opposed to
a legal, doctrine,'' international law is, on many occasions, merely
equivalent to what the political winds will accept.
95. See Christopher C. Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the
Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 140 (citing A. J. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 (1967)).
96. See Schacter, supra note 94, at 1620, 1641-43.
97. See Thomas G. Weiss, The United Nations and Civil Wars, WASH. Q., Autumn 1994, at
137.
98. FRANcEs H. STEPHENS, WE THE PEOPLE 43 (1987).
99. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, at 315.
100. Alan Berman, In Mitigation of Illegality: The U.S. Invasion of Panama, 79 KY. L.J. 735
n.7 (1991) (citing A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION - THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE
AMERiCAS 30, 52-53 (1956)).
101. See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, at 316.
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2. The Brezhnev Doctrine
The Brezhnev Doctrine is one of limited sovereignty whereby one
socialist state has the duty to intervene in the affairs of another socialist
state where the second state has strayed from the socialist path. The
damaging influence in such situations would be the enemies of
Socialism.'02
Thus, comparing the Brezhnev Doctrine with the Monroe Doctrine,
certain differences and similarities can be deduced. First, where the
Monroe Doctrine is apparently limited by geography, the Brezhnev
Doctrine suffers no such infirmity. Second, where the Brezhnev Doc-
trine stresses the protection of Soviet political principles, the Monroe
Doctrine does not (at least in its original formulation). However, in
practice, the actions of the United States, to preserve democracy in the
American sphere of influence, have, on occasion, taken on aspects of
the Brezhnev Doctrine. 0 3 But, at least one scholar rejects such a com-
parison and similarities between the Monroe and Brezhnev Doc-
trines."
3. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine is the product of two cases decided by
the Supreme Court. In Ker v. Illinois, 5 Ker was kidnapped by a pri-
vate security agent from Peru and taken to Illinois where he was tried
and convicted under various criminal statutes. Although there was ap-
parently an extradition treaty and documents for Ker's extradition, they
were not used. The Court, in affirming Ker's conviction, addressed the
specific terms of the treaty and found that none of the terms had been
violated. The Court, however, ignored the issues of sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
In Frisbie v. Collins,1"6 Michigan police officers kidnapped
Frisbie from Chicago and brought him to trial in Michigan. The Court
declined to overturn Frisbie's conviction, thus, placing the imprimatur
of the state upon interstate abduction where the person was extraditable
through normal channels, even if the proper procedure was ignored.
Thus, under the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, jurisdiction could be gained
through illegal acts, such as kidnapping, even if the effect is to reward
102. See Charles T. Baroch, The Soviet Doctrine of Sovereignty, 1970 A.B.A. STANDING
COMM. ON EDUC. ABOUT COMMUNISM 19.
103. See discussion infra part I.B. (the justifications offered by the United States for the ac-
tions in Haiti, Grenada, and Panama).
104. See John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World
Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 114-15 (1986).
105. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
106. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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police lawlessness,"' but not if the violation was so severe as to
shock the conscience. 8 However, on remand"° and in another
case,"' the same circuit ruled a short time later that the Toscanino
exception does not apply where there is no official U.S. involvement.
Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations states that
the arrest of a person within the borders of a foreign state, without that
state's consent, is illegal."' The Reporters' Note 3 indicates that such
an abduction is permissible as long as the nation from which the abduc-
tion occurred does not protest.
III. THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
A. The Invasion of Grenada
1. Facts
Grenada is a tiny Caribbean island with a population of slightly
more than 100,000. In 1974, Great Britain granted Grenada its inde-
pendence, yet Grenada still remained a Commonwealth nation. Early in
October of 1983, there was a military coup which installed a new mili-
tary regime.'
The United States invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983, with
1,900 soldiers extensively supported by air and naval powers. This
number was later expanded to 6,000. Approximately 400 troops from
other Caribbean nations joined the action."3 The action required no
more than a few days to subdue the Cuban contingent, numbering 1100
soldiers and workers. Casualties were minimal. Subsequent reports
indicated that no United States citizen had been harmed by the new
regime prior to the invasion."4 Why then did this occur?
Grenada had just experienced a military coup which had installed a
socialist regime and there were approximately 1,000 United States
citizens allegedly trapped on the island,"5 including 700 medical stu-
107. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 1974).
108. See id. at 273.
109. See United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (2d Cir. 1975).
110. See Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 63-66 (2d Cir. 1975).
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 cmt. b (1987).
112. See Kenneth W. Banta, Spice Island Power Play; After Bloody Takeover, A U.S. Force
Steams Into Range, TIME, Oct. 31, 1983" at 78.
113. See Ed Magnusen, D-Day in Grenada; The U.S. and friends take over a troubled Ca-
ribbean Isle, TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 22.
114. See Situation in Grenada, 20 UN MONTHLY CHRON. 15, Dec. 1983, at 16; Walter
Isaacson, Weighing the Proper Role; Grenada and Lebanon Illustrate The Uses and Limits of
Power, TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 42.
115. The United States Embassy on Grenada received a diplomatic note from the new Gre-
nada government prior to the invasion stating that American citizens were in no danger and
would be allowed to leave. Apparently the United States State Department chose to ignore the
note. See Isaacson, supra note 114, at 42.
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dents. The primary justifications offered by the United States for the
invasion included: (1) the protection of United States citizens, 116 (2)
United States national security," 7 (3) a request from the Organization
of East Caribbean States for the United States to invade," 8 and (4)
concern about Grenada's status as a Cuban-Soviet satellite being a
threat to democracy." 9 The United States Department of State, Office
of the Legal Advisor, in a letter to the American Bar Association's
Section on International Law and Practice, dated February 10, 1984,
presented three reasons to justify the invasion of Grenada: (1) invitation
of the lawful government authorities of that state, (2) authority of a
regional organization to maintain international peace and security, and
(3) the right to protect a state's own nationals."2
2. Response
The worldwide response to the invasion of Grenada was intense.
The American media criticized it.' Numerous nations denounced it
as a violation of international law. Most notably, the United Nations
General Assembly in its resolution characterized the invasion of Grena-
da as a "flagrant violation of international law and of the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of that state.... [and] deplores the
death of innocent civilians resulting from the armed intervention."'2 3
3. Analysis
Given the small size of Grenada, it cannot be realistically argued
that Grenada, or its new government, posed a military threat to the
United States. Further, given that Grenada had an extremely small mili-
tary, it was highly unlikely that the nation could have been considered
116. See Situation in Grenada, supra note 114, at 15; see also Isaacson, supra note 114, at
42.
117. See Isaacson, supra note 114, at 42. Fears of a new large airport on Grenada as a possi-
ble refueling stop for planes en route to Nicaragua were also cited as justifications for the ac-
tion. Lou Cannon, Strategic Airport, Hostage Fears Led to Move, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1983,
at Al. However, such a claim is questionable given the close proximity of Cuba which could,
and apparently did, serve the same purpose. See id.
118. See Situation in Grenada, supra note 114; see also Isaacson, supra note 114, at 42.
119. See Isaacson, supra note 114; see also Situation in Grenada, supra note 114, at 19.
120. See Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice, 78 AM. J. INTv'L L. 655, 662 (July 1984).
121. See generally Goliath in Grenada, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1983, at Di8; see also Abram
Chayes, Grenada Was Illegally Invaded, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 15, 1983, at A35.
122. See Michael J. Berlin, The Invasion of Grenada; Cuba & Mexico Ask U. Action
Against U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1983, at A9. See, e.g., Peter Osnos, British Saw Invasion as
Unjustified, Dangerous, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1983, at A14; see also Anthony Robinson, The
Invasion of Grenada: USSR and China Unite in Protest Against 'Violation', FIN. TiMES, Oct.
27, 1983, at 4.
123. U.N. Doc. A/38/PV.43. Text of the U.N. Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1983, at 4.
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to be an imperialistic threat to its Caribbean neighbors. Thus, self de-
fense, individual or collective, is not an acceptable justification.
However, under the levels of threat to national security, it is ap-
parent that Grenada might have constituted an aggravation to the United
States. Nevertheless, aggravation is not a proper justification for a mili-
tary invasion. Further, even assuming that there was a threat to United
States national security, the invasion went beyond the bounds of neces-
sity and proportionality.
Regarding the protection of United States citizens, there might have
been a potential threat. However, no United States citizen had been in-
jured and the new Grenada government had offered to allow United
States citizens to leave. Why was this offer not accepted by the United
States? Even if this reason legitimately supported the military action by
the United States, the action went beyond the scope of protecting citi-
zens when the current government was removed.
The request of the Organization of East Caribbean States, as a
justification for the invasion, is also insufficient.12 As Joyner indi-
cates, the present grounds in this situation, do not justify an invasion
based on the request of one of its members. Further, since the United
States, Jamaica, and Barbados participated in the invasion and were not
members of the Organization of East Caribbean States,"z the use of
such an invitation is extremely suspect.
26
The request of the lawful government authorities of the nation in
question, as justification for the invasion, is also suspect. What consti-
tutes the lawful governing authority of a nation when a change of gov-
ernment has occurred by force and other governments do not recognize
the change? 27 In this matter, there was a de facto government in
place. Drawing an uncomfortable analogy, there is an argument that the
American Revolution was unjustified. Thus, the American government
is subject to removal by military force. In either case, the new de facto
government was the government of Grenada. Given the announced
reason by the United States (the threat of Grenada to democracy as a
Soviet satellite), it appears that the use of the invitation of the "legiti-
mate" government was merely a pretext for the invasion. Indeed, this
reason fits comfortably within the Brezhnev Doctrine. I 8
124. See Joyner, supra note 95, at 136.
125. See Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Carribean States, June 18, 1981, 20
I.L.M. 1166, 1167 (1981).
126. See Joyner, supra note 95, at 136-37.
127. See generally I OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, at 126 (discussing the aspects of recogni-
tion of governments and acknowledging that non-recognition, alone, is not sufficient to deny a
government international legal status).
128. See discussion infra part H.F.
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Additional criticism of the United States is that peaceful means
were not employed prior to the invasion. Under the United Nations
Charter2 9  and the Organization of American States Charter,30
peaceful means must be attempted first. The United States violated its
obligations to employ such methods. Indeed, the Organization of Amer-




As one author stated, ten years later, although the "Reagan admin-
istration officials did not consider the United States strictly bound by
international legal norms, neither did they wish U.S. actions to be
viewed as flagrant derelictions of international law." ' This statement
illustrates that, as is true in all politics, image is more important than
substance. Thus, there was no justifiable reason for the United States'
invasion of Grenada. The invasion constituted a violation of interna-
tional law under the United Nations and Organization of American
States Charters"' regarding the sovereignty of another nation.
129. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, 1.
130. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER art. 20.
131. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER art. 18.
132. Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Decision to Invade Grenada: A Ten-Year
Retrospective, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 765, 817 (1993).
133. Article 18 states as follows:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State....
Article 20 states as follows:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even tempo-
rarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another
State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.
Article 21 states as follows:
The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to
have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense ....
Article 23 states as follows:
All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be
submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter ....
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER.
Article 2 states as follows:
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means...
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state ....
Article 33 states as follows:
1. The parties to any dispute, ... shall, first of all, seek a solution by nego-
tiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement .... or
other peaceful means.
U.N. CHARTER.
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B. The Invasion of Panama
1. Facts
The Central American nation of Panama had approximately 35,000
American citizens residing within its borders at the time of the inva-
sion. 34 General Manuel Noriega, the self proclaimed Panamanian
"Maximum Leader", 35 had a long history with the United States in-
cluding a lucrative stint as a CIA informer. 6 The relationship contin-
ued, although the CIA was apparently well aware of Noriega's viola-
tions of human rights.
137
Political problems with Noriega brewed for years, primarily focus-
ing upon his activities in the drug trade. 3 However, the "last straw"
was the killing of a United States Marine Lieutenant and the subsequent
brutalization of a Naval Lieutenant and his wife who had witnessed the
event.'39 Prior to the invasion, the United States had attempted numer-
ous other "solutions" concerning Noriega which included propaganda,
economic sanctions, and a failed coup."4
Further, there had been numerous reports of human rights viola-
tions in Panama under Noriega. 141 However, one report indicated that
such human rights violations would likely continue even after Noriega's
departure. 4
2
On December 20, 1989, the United States invaded the nation of
Panama, employing 24,000 soldiers.'43 The justification for the large
number of troops employed included the necessity to protect the large
numbers of American citizens present in Panama. During the invasion,
despite the number of United States troops, apparently some American
civilian hostages were taken and killed.'"
Other incidents raising questions of international law, besides the
invasion itself, occurred during the action. For example, United States
personnel sacked the Nicaraguan Embassy and when Noriega sought
political asylum in the Vatican City Embassy, the United States pro-
134. See David Adams, et al., The Invasion of Panama, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1990, at 12.
135. See After Panama; American Interventionism, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 1990, at 9.
136. See Jonathan Alter, For Bush, the Best of a Bad Bargain?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1990, at
23.
137. See, e.g., Robert E. White, Call Off the Spies, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1996, at A19.
138. See Berman, supra note 100, at 740.
139. See Adam et al., supra note 134, at 12.
140. See George Church, Showing Muscle With the Invasion of Panama, TIME, Jan. 1, 1990,
at 20.
141. See Report Alleges Human Rights Abuses in Panama, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at 8.
142. Dennis McAuliffe, Jr., Hunan Rights Abuses in Panama Said to Rise; Report Sees
Problem Outlasting Noriega, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1988, at A26.
143. See Stephen Manning, The U.S. Invasion of Panama, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Feb. 9,
1990, at 8.
144. See Adams et al., supra note 134, at 14.
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ceeded to bombard the embassy with round-the-clock hard rock music.
Neither of these associated actions met the mandates of international
law"'5 and, further, placed a cloud around the legitimacy of the inva-
sion itself.
The justifications offered for the invasion included: 1) that Noriega
himself declared that a "state of war" existed with the United
States," 2) the right of self defense," 3) that Noriega's actions
threatened the interests of the United States, i.e., the Panama Canal,"
4) to bring Noriega to trial in the United States concerning drug traf-
ficking, 49 to restore democratic government in Panama,' and to
protect the lives of United States citizens."'
2. Response
Even though the invasion apparently had significant political sup-
port at home, its validity under international law was questioned in the
media.15 2 In Latin America, even though most nations despised
Noriega, i5 3 the invasion was unanimously criticized as a violation of
international law. 5' The United Nations and the Organization of
American States also condemned the invasion.'55 The Organization of
American States voted 20-1 expressing its "regret" that the invasion oc-
curred. '6 The legitimacy of the United States invasion was further
questioned when the new U.S. installed leader of Panama announced to
the United Nations that Panama had not requested a United States inva-
sion, contradicting the apparent assertions of the Bush Administration,
dozens of nations continued the criticism of the invasion and the United
States.1 7
145. See After Panama, American Interventionism, supra note 135, at 9.
146. See Manning, supra note 143, at 8.
147. See id.
148. See id.; Adams et al., supra note 134, at 21; Alter, supra note 136, at 23.
149. See Manning, supra note 143, at 8; see also Church, supra note 140, at 20.
150. See Manning, supra note 143, at 8; see also After Panama, American Interventionism,
supra note 135, at 9; see also Alter, supra note 136, at 23; Church, supra note 140, at 20.
151. See Adams et al., supra note 134, at 21; see also After Panama, American Interven-
tionism, supra note 135, at 9; see also After, supra note 136, at 23.
152. See William M LeoGrande, Panama, The Invasion is Beginning to Look Like George
Bush's Grenada: A Successful Low Cost Strike to Rid Our Neighborhood of a Pest, L.A. TbIEs,
Dec. 28, 1989, at B7; see also Diego Ribadeneira, Resentment of US Spread in Panama City,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 1990, at 1; see also Pfaff, supra note 1, at C3; Repairing the Damage
in Panama, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1990, at 14.
153. See Church, supra note 140, at 20.
154. See Michael S. Serrill, The Post Invasion Blues, TIME, Jan. 29, 1990, at 28.
155. See After Panama, American Interventionism, supra note 135, at 9.
156. See Adams et al., supra note 134, at 12.
157. See Ethan Schwartz, World Criticism of U.S. Invasion Mounts, WASH. POST, Nov 22,
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3. Analysis
Generally, when a nation presents a declaration of war, it is safe to
assume that military hostilities are imminent. However, was Noriega's
claim that a state of war existed between the United States and Panama
a legitimate excuse for an invasion? It cannot be realistically argued
that Panama militarily threatened the United States. Thus, self-defense
is not a legitimate justification.
It is more likely that Noriega's claim was just political posturing.
In contrast, what if certain political statements made by numerous Unit-
ed States Presidents were taken just as seriously by the world as the
United States took Noriega's statement? The result would, no doubt,
have led to many more international crises.
Concerning the protection of the United States citizens in Panama,
there may have been some legitimate concerns.'58 But there are also
questions. If there was a genuine state of war between Panama and the
United States and if there was a legitimate threat to United States citi-
zens, why were the numerous civilians not evacuated from Panama
prior to the invasion? As is shown by the length of time that the dis-
pute with Noriega spanned, there was more than sufficient time to
conduct such an evacuation. Further, rescue missions of nationals must
be bound by the requirements of proportionality and necessity, 59 nei-
ther of which were present."
The United States claim that the Panama Canal was at risk was
refuted by Pentagon officials, who freely conceded that the Panama
Canal was not at risk.'6 ' Further, what other United States interests
were at stake which would justify a full-scale military invasion which
toppled a recognized government? None. Although it may be claimed
that the United States had justification to invade, regarding the integrity
of the Panama Canal treaties, this claim has been soundly refuted. 62
Finally, even the treaty between the United States and Panama
forbids the United States from interfering in the internal affairs of
Panama.'63 Further, this same treaty establishes a joint board to ensure
the security of the Panama Canal, which the United States failed to use.
1989, at A29.
158. See Ved P. Nanda, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights
Activists, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 497 (1990).
159. See Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INT'L. 503, 506
(1990).
160. For example, a few deaths and injuries do not meet the requirement of proportionality.
Id. at 513. See also Nanda, supra note 158, at 495-96.
161. See Adams et al., supra note 134, at 12.
162. See Nanda, supra note 158, at 500; see Berman, supra note 100, at 761-64.
163. See Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Panama, art. IV, T.I.A.S. No. 10,300.
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The restoration of a democratic government in Panama is also
suspect. 1"4 Not only did the United States, at least tacitly through its
inaction, approve of Noriega's position as a dictator; the United States
was likewise responsible, if not just indirectly, for his position and con-
tinuation. As indicated by the history of events, the United States seri-
ously considered Noriega a problem only when he, exercising the rights
of a sovereign, began to reject American influence. It was at that point
that the status of Panama, as a non-democracy, began to have signifi-
cance, if only as a pretext. Numerous authorities refute the legality of
this reason."'
Thus, use of this reason is, like the same justification for the inva-
sion of Grenada, almost identical to the Brezhnev Doctrine.' 66 Indeed,
the media quickly seized upon the analogy, comparing Bush's possible
New World Order of the United States to being an international police-
man to maintain democracy.' 7 One correspondent even likened the
New World Order, whether in Panama or Kuwait, as world domina-
tion."~ The criticism was even more pointed when a former Ambassa-
dor to Panama indicated that the use of force by the United States to
dispose an undesirable foreign leader is a common United States prac-
tice. 16
9
What many view as the primary reason for the invasion, the arrest
of Noriega to answer drug trafficking charges in the United States, is of
questionable value under international law,70 but well within the
boundaries of United States law. Although some may argue that the
apprehension of Noriega was merely ancillary to the invasion, from the
previous discussion illustrating the invalidity of the invasion on the
other claimed grounds, it is evident that the seizure of Noriega was
merely an ostentatious kidnapping.
17
'
Under United States law and the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, the manner
of bringing a suspect before the courts is irrelevant.' Jurisdiction, tri-
al, and conviction will be upheld.
173
164. For example, according to several authors, the restoration of democracy has never been
accepted as a legitimate reason for invasion. See Nanda, supra note 158, at 500 n.33 (citing
Oscar Schacter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1985).
165. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 100, at 772-79.
166. See infra Part I. F of this article.
167. See Church, supra note 140, at 20.
168. See Steve Chapman, Does Bush Want U.S. Domination or a New World Order?, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 17, 1991, at C3.
169. See John M. Goshko & Al Kamen, A New US Willingness to Use Force, WASH. POST,
Jan. 5, 1990, at A8.
170. See Nanda, supra note 158, at 501.
171. See Berman, supra note 100, at 779-82.
172. See infra Part I.F.
173. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.655 (1992).
19961
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
However, under international law, the matter is somewhat different.
Customary international law requires that proper procedures be used to
bring a suspect to trial from a foreign nation and that kidnapping is not
proper.'74 In such a situation, the entire question of sovereignty is at
issue as the kidnapping nation is exercising their sovereign powers
within the boundaries of the offended nation.
Practically, there are a number of examples which illustrate the
illegality of these actions. Nazi Germany acknowledged that such
kidnappings are illegal. 7 South Africa, during the time of apartheid,
acknowledged that such kidnappings were illegal.'76 Great Britain, the
source of American common law, ruled that such kidnappings were
illegal."r In all three of these examples, the courts of each nation
ruled that the kidnapped person was to be returned. Further, the United
States position is severely undermined by its criticism of other nations
engaging in this behavior.'
One authority who supported the invasion of Panama implicitly
recognized that the proffered reasons were invalid by stating that of-
fered rationales are irrelevant, but the act should be evaluated indepen-
dently. 79 This same author was of the opinion that the human rights
violations justified the invasion."' However, this argument is ques-
tionable given that human rights violations in Panama, and many other
"friendly" nations, have been ignored as long as those nations adhere to
United States interests.
The United States' invasion violated the United Nations Char-
ter '8 in that it was beyond the boundaries of necessity and propor-
tionality and attacked the government itself. This invasion also violated
Organization of American States Charter'82, employed military force
and intervened in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.
174. See SHAW, supra note 42, at 393.
175. See Lawrence Preuss, Kidnapping of Fugitives From Justice on Foreign Territory, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1935).
176. See Jacques Semmelman, Decisions of Regional and Foreign Courts, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 133 (1993) (examining the South African case of State v. Ebrahim, 31 I.L.M. 888 (1992).
177. See Ex parte Bennett, 3 All E.R. 138 (1993), 3 W.L.R. 90 (1993). For a discussion of
the case, See 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1995).
178. See Sidney Zion, If Israel Put a Bounty on Arafat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1990, at A17;
see also Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Bounty Hunters" and the Drug War, CHwc. T B., Apr. 26, 1990,
at C27.
179. See Anthony D'Amato, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human
Rights Activists? 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (Apr. 1990).
180. See id. at 520.
181. See Berman, supra note 100, 752-54.
182. See id. at 756-61.
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C. The Mining of Nicaragua's Harbors
1. Facts
Nicaragua is a small nation in Central America. In 1979, there was
a revolt which resulted in an essentially military government. 3 Sub-
sequently, the Nicaraguan government was responsible for numerous
human rights violations.'84 Further, the Nicaraguan government forged
close ties with the Soviet-bloc including shipments of arms. They began
destabilizing activities in neighboring nations such as El Salvador.'
During the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, the United States
was essentially involved in a "secret war" supporting the Contra's, a
pro-United States guerilla group, in an effort to topple the unfriendly
Sandinista government." One part of this "secret war" was the min-
ing of Nicaragua's harbors which involved the Central Intelligence
Agency(CIA).' 7 As a result of the mining, not only were three Nica-
raguan vessels sunk, but a dozen freighters from various other nations
(including the Soviet Union, Japan, and Great Britain) were damaged
with injuries to crew members.'
When Nicaragua asked the United Nations Security Council for a
resolution denouncing the mining, the United States was forced to use
its veto to prevent the resolution from passing.'89 Subsequently, Nica-
ragua filed suit in The International Court of Justice on April 9,
1984."9 However, three days before the suit was filed, the United
States stated that it would not accept the jurisdiction of the Court. 9'
Subsequently, the United States withdrew from the case and refused to
recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice." De-
spite this refusal to recognize jurisdiction, Nicaragua prevailed before
the International Court of Justice ' 3 as well as in the forum of world
opinion.
183. See Moore, supra note 104, at 44-45.
184. See id. at 117 n.293 & 121 n.324 and accompanying text.
* 185. See generally id.
186. See George Church, Explosion Over Nicaragua, TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 16.
187. See id.; see also Steven Strasser et al., The CIA's Harbor Warfare, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
16, 1984, at 45.
188. See Robert A. Kittle, An Exercise in Delicate Harassment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Apr. 23, 1984, at 23.
189. See Church, supra note 186, at 16.
190. See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1445 (1985).
191. See Pico Iyer, Trouble With the Law, TIME, Dec. 10, 1984, at 42.
192. See Letter of Secretary of State George P. Schultz to the United Nations, (Oct. 7,
1985), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 297
(1991)) (notifying the United Nations that the United States was terminating its recognition of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice).
193. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (Jun. 27).
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The culpability of the United States was highlighted in 1986, when
a military cargo plane was shot down while delivering arms and ammu-
nition to the Contras. The sole surviving crewman was captured and
confessed that the CIA (of the United States) was responsible for this
and other such missions. 94 However, none of these facts are meant to
mitigate any clear violations of international law by Nicaragua.'95 The
purpose of this article is to examine the actions of the United States.
2. Response
The media lambasted the United States for the mining of
Nicaragua's harbors, one critic referring to it as "harebrained.""'
Even the allies of the United States, including France and Great Britain,
expressed their dismay in the actions of the United States concerning
the mining. 97 Domestically, even staunch Republicans in the Con-
gress criticized the actions.' This resulted in resolutions passed in
both Houses calling for the ending of the mining.
The United States was also strongly criticized for its refusal to
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for
two reasons: first, the United States had accepted jurisdiction ever since
the Court's inception; and second, the United States was compared to
Iran, which refused to acknowledge the decision of the International
Court of Justice when it decided for the United States in the Hostage
Case."' International legal authorities expressed grave concern as to
the consequences of this action of the United States.2"
3. Analysis
The essential issue of this matter is not just limited to the mining
of Nicaragua's harbors but encompasses the total response to
Nicaragua's actions by the United States. Generally, was the United
States justified in assisting El Salvador in their troubles with Nicaragua
and, specifically, was the mining of Nicaragua's harbors, as an illustra-
tive example of United States actions, justified?
194. See Peter Ross Range & Steven Emerson, A Doomed Arms Drop; Is the CIA Breaking
the Law in Nicaragua?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, OcL 20, 1986, at 6.
195. See Moore, supra note 104, at 79-85.
196. See Tom Wicker, Covert Means Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1989, at A29.
197. See Church, supra note 186, at 16.
198. See id.
199. See Iyer, supra note 191, at 42; see also World Courts' Black Eye for Uncle Sam, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 21, 1984, at 13.
200. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 190; see also Alfred P. Rubin, Nicaragua, The World
Court, and the United States, THE CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, July 15, 1986, at 13.
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There is little doubt that one nation, in the role of an ally, can
come to the aid of another nation under attack."' Thus, the United
States, as an ally of El Salvador, would be generally permitted to assist
under the principle of collective self-defense. 2' But does insurgency,
in the form of guerilla warfare, constitute such an attack? The actual
decision by the International Court of Justice in this matter 3 clearly
shows that such activity will trigger a nation's right to employ defen-
sive measures, indicating that such activity is an attack. But do defen-
sive measures include the right to mine harbors (i.e., to enter the
boundaries of the alleged violator and take what amounts to essentially
offensive action)?
Did the actions by Nicaragua justify the actions of the United
States in the manner taken? Moore says yes, but he concentrates his
argument on the preservation of world order.2' However, implicit in
Moore's argument is the role assumed by the United States as the world
policeman for democracy. This undeniably implicates the Monroe and
Brezhnev Doctrines, which Moore vehemently argues are not accurately
applied to the Nicaragua situation. Moore, with some validity, argues
that a nation is entitled to an effective defense. 20 5
Should an effective defense, in turn violate international law? Ac-
cording to Oscar Schacter, a third nation does not have the right to
carry on a counter-intervention within the boundaries of a nation where
civil war is not occurring.20
In response, James P. Rowles points to the lack of evidence that
the government of Nicaragua was responsible for the actions in El
Salvador. If sufficient evidence did exist to justify the acts of the Unit-
ed States, why did the United States not present it to the International
Court of Justice and accept judgment? Further, Rowles notes that sub-
mission of a dispute to the neutral analysis of a third party is funda-
mental to justice.2' The United States, by refusing to acknowledge
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, unilaterally placed
itself above the law.
Moore argues that America was not using the Brezhnev Doctrine
but responding to insurgency. 2°s Further, Moore claims that the United
201. See 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 77 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed., 1952.
202. See Schacter, supra note 94, at 1642.
203. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 4 (Jun. 27).
204. See Moore, supra note 104, at 43.
205. See id. at 43.
206. See Schacter, supra note 94, at 1643-44.
207. See James P. Rowles, "Secret Wars," Self Defense and the Charter - A Reply to Pro-
fessor Moore, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 568 (1986).
208. See Moore, supra note 104, at 111.
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States did not seek the overthrow of the Sandinista government. 2°9
Moore's claim is patently invalid as shown by the stated desire of Unit-
ed States to install democratic governments in Latin America (i.e.,
Grenada, Panama, etc.).
One critic rather pointedly noted that for George Bush's New
World order to become a true reality, the world's only remaining super-
power, the United States, must support the International Court of Justice
and international law.21 Violations of the sovereignty of weaker na-
tions and refusal to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice do not create images of a just New World Order, but
rather nightmares of world domination. From a practical perspective,
one author suggests that only through the use of the superior ideology
and humane behavior, (i.e., read this as adherence to international law)
and not using violent methods (e.g., the mining of harbors), will the
West (the United States) be able to prevail over tyranny.2 '
The decision of the International Court of Justice itself, on the
212 thmerits, stated that the United States violated international law by its
actions. Critiques of the decision, such as those presented by Moore,
are merely attempts to soften the political repercussions of the acts and
of the decision.213
D. The Haiti Affair
1. Facts
Jean Bertrand Aristide, a former Catholic priest, was President of
Haiti until approximately eight (8) months after the 1990 election.
Aristide, a former favorite of the United States, lost United States sup-
port after criticizing the United States. At that time, September of 1991,
in response to economic reforms which alienated the business elite of
Haiti, the military mounted a successful coup led by General Raoul
Cedras.
Throughout the reign of Cedras, there were numerous reports of
human rights abuses. The reports were given additional weight when
Cedras ordered over one hundred human rights observers from the
United Nations and the Organization of American States to leave the
209. See id. at 112.
210. See The Brendan Brown Lecture, The United States and the World Court in the Post
"Cold War" Era, 40 CATH. U.L. REv. 251, 259 (1991).
211. See Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line For Covert Operations, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 284 (1992).
212. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 4 (Jun. 27).
213. Compare John Norton Moore, Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United
States (Merits), 81 Am. J. INT'L L. 151 (1987) and Richard Falk, Appraisals of the ICJ's Deci-
sion: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 106 (1987).
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country."' Aggravating the situation was the enormous number of
refugees fleeing Haiti who sought sanctuary in the United States-
reportedly as many as two to three thousand per day. 2 5 Political pos-
turing between both nations only increased the tension. 16
During this period of dispute with Haiti, the United States pres-
sured the United Nations to grant official sanctioning of a Haiti inva-
sion."' The political record indicates, however, that the United States
was seeking the approval from the United Nations as a means to lend
additional credibility to the action," 8 implying that the invasion might
still have occurred even without the approval. This implication is rein-
forced by the fact that United States forces were prepared to deploy
before the approval was gained from the United Nations. 9 Indeed,
one United States Embassy spokesman stated that an invasion could not
be ruled out even before the United Nations granted approval,22 thus,
giving a not-so-veiled threat to Cedras and the United Nations.
Despite the invasion cancellation, on September 19, 1994, the
United States landed a significant military force in Haiti. Even though
the invading forces announced that "This is not war,""1 such a mili-
tary maneuver into a sovereign foreign nation could only be considered
an invasion, despite the fact that former President Carter's last-minute
diplomatic efforts most likely prevented more serious bloodshedY2
The United States offered a number of justifications for the inva-
sion. At one point, the White House used the Monroe Doctrine to justi-
fy the action.2 The United States also used the authorization of the
United Nations to invade as justification for the action. 4 The threat
of the increasing number of refugees was also used as grounds to justi-
fy the invasion.2" Even the conservative Senator, Robert Dole, reject-
214. See George Church, Threat and Defiance, TIME, July 25, 1994, at 20.
215. See Herbert Buchsbaum, Operation: Restore Democracy, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Nov. 4,
1994, at 6.
216. See Church, supra note 214.
217. See Daniel Williams & Julia Preston, U.S. Requests Open-Ended Resolution From U.N.
Backing Invasion of Haiti, WASH. POST, July 22, 1994, at A10.
218. See id.
219. See Ann Devroy & Bradley Graham, U.S. Units Ready To Invade But Clinton Is Said
To Be Weeks From Decision, WASH. POST, July 17, 1994, at A21.
220. See Randall Mikkelsen, Embassy Asks Haiti Leaders to Step Down, CHIC. SUN-TIMES,
July 24, 1994, at 36.
221. See Buchsbaum, supra note 215.
222. See Bruce W. Nelan, The Road to Haiti, TIME, Oct. 3, 1994, at 32. See also Fred
Barnes, Oh, All Right Then, US Intervention in Haiti, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 10, 1994, at 11.
223. See Samuel Francis, The Dumbest Possible Reason For Occupying Haiti, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1994, at A21.
224. See Many of Haiti's Neighbors Oppose U.S. Backed Invasion, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, July 29, 1994, at 43A.
225. See Hugh de Santis & Kenneth J. Dillon, Review Lessons of 1915 U.S. Invasion Had
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ed that argument.26 The economic embargo was considered to be a
prime reason for the refugee problem, as opposed to the position of the
White House that the refugees were a result of Cedras' policies.
Other offered reasons included United States national interests and
the securing of democracy in Haiti. 7 President Clinton, in an address
to the nation on September 15, 1994, presented four reasons to justify
the action: (1) international human rights-to stop the atrocities; (2)
national security-to preserve the borders of the United States; (3) to
preserve stability in the region; and (4) to ensure democracy.2"
2. Response
The domestic response to the invasion of Haiti was not posi-
tive. 29 Although the media reported that there was a significant posi-
tive response to the occupation of Haiti, it was tempered with the idea
that the positive aspects were that a full-scale invasion did not occur
and that the action had the support of the United Nations.2 0 However,
some media outlets reported that Haiti's neighbors stated that the use of
force against Haiti was not justified,"3 but that was before the United
Nations approval.
Interestingly, Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the United
Nations, was of the opinion that Haiti was not a threat to international
or United States peace and security. 2 Essential to Kirkpatrick's call
for no invasion, was the notion of the sovereignty of nations. One
newspaper compared the invasion of Haiti to the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968." In that situation, like the United States
obtaining approval from the United Nations, the Soviets obtained the
approval of the Warsaw Pact prior to invading Czechoslovakia. This
same article noted that the notorious Russian ultra-nationalists approved
of the invasion of Haiti; thus, providing these same Russians, if they
Little Effect on Haiti, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 12, 1994, at 19.
226. See Norman Kempster, Haiti Invasion Would Be Legal, White House Says, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, July 18, 1994, at 8.
227. See Devroy & Graham, supra note 219.
228. See U.S. Interests in Haiti, 5 U.S. DEP'T STATE DISPATCH 38 (Sept. 19, 1994).
229. See Jack Nelson & Stanley Meisler, Clinton To Argue For Haiti Invasion, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 2, 1994, at Al; see also Church, supra note 214, at 20; see also Buchsbaum, supra note
215, at 6.
230. See Howard Lafranchi, Why Outcry Not Heard From Latin Neighbors On Haiti, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 22, 1994, at 1.
231. See Many of Haiti's Neighbors Oppose U.S. Backed Invasion, supra note 224.
232. See Jeane Kirkpatrick, How Haiti Fits Into a New Foreign Policy, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Aug. 22, 1994, at A06.
233. See Dimitri Simes, One Man's Bully May Be Another Man's Protector, BUFFALO
NEwS, Oct. 2, 1994, at F7.
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obtain political power and position, with international precedent to take
similar actions.
3. Analysis
One author expressed her position that the intervention in Haiti was
appropriate under two grounds: (1) an emerging right to democracy in
conjunction with (2) a justification based upon human rights viola-
tions. 4 These same reasons were used in conjunction with the ad-
vancement of American interests and security. 5
However, these supporters of the intervention in Haiti fail to con-
sider certain matters, such as international law. For example, it is well
established that it is illegal under international law to intervene in order
to advance particular political systemsY6 Further, it cannot be serious-
ly argued that United States national security was threatened by Haiti.
Under Tipson's level of threats the United States suffered, at the most,
minimal financial deprivation supporting the refugees.237 Thus, mili-
tary intervention would hardly be appropriate under these circumstances
because they would be beyond the mandates of necessity and propor-
tionality.
The claim that Haiti constituted a threat to stability in the region is
suspect. Haiti's problems were strictly internal. The only effect which
went beyond its borders were the refugees. Although, under the United
Nations Charter,23' it is legal to intervene where there is a threat to
international peace, refugees can hardly be considered such a threat.
The strongest reason advanced by the United States for its inter-
vention was the human rights violation. Emerging principles of interna-
tional law tend to recognize this reason as legitimate justification for
intervention.239 However, given the insubstantiality of the other of-
fered reasons; given the pressure the United States brought against the
United Nations to obtain authorization; and given the lack of action by
the United States against other nations which may have a greater quan-
tity and quality of human rights violations; (especially where the viola-
tors of human rights are "friendly" to United States policies) the legiti-
macy of this reason is in question.2 °
234. See Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights:
The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COmP. &
INT'L L. 329 (1995).
235. See Tony Smith, In Defense of Intervention, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 34.
236. See Oscar Schacter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645
(1984).
237. See supra Part II. E of this article.
238. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41-42.
239. See supra Part II E of this article.
240. For example, the notoriously repressive regimes of the Shah of Iran and Saddam
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Moreover, intervention to protect human rights has yet to receive
full acceptance in the international community as there is still the
thorny question of sovereignty, which is paramount in any consideration
of intervention with the use of force.24' The United Nations Charter
only permits the use of force in self defense or in response to a threat
to international peace.242 Similarly, the Organization of American
States Charter prohibits the use of force, except in a case of self de-
fense.2 43
Even more illuminating, the Pentagon refuses to release certain
reports which criticize the Haiti operation and simply compares the
situation to the fiasco in Somalia.2' Despite the "approval" of the
action by the United Nations, there appears to be little dispute that
certain norms of international law were violated by the action taken in
Haiti. However, this situation merely underscores the fact that interna-
tional law is, in practice, more a function of politics than of law.
E. The Kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-Machain
1. Facts
In 1985, a DEA agent was murdered in Mexico.245 Dr. Alvarez-
Machain was suspected of being an accomplice to the murder. As a
result, on April 2, 1990, the DEA engineered the kidnapping of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain. He was abducted at gunpoint, from Guadalajara,
Mexico, and brought to the United States.2" During the abduction, Dr.
Alvarez-Machain was shocked a number of times and injected with a
drug which made him dizzy.247
There was an extradition treaty in effect between the United States
and Mexico at the time of the kidnapping.24 On April 18 and May
16, 1990, the government of Mexico presented the United States with
diplomatic notes requesting information on the participation of the
United States in the kidnapping and demanding the return of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain.249
Dr. Alvarez-Machain filed a motion to dismiss based upon the
circumstances of his abduction being a violation of international law,
Hussein of Iraq were strongly supported by the United States until they turned away from Unit-
ed States policy.
241. See Schacter, supra note 94, at 1645.
242. See UNrTED NATIONS CHARTER arts. 39, 51.
243. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER art. 21.
244. See Mark Thompson, The Past as Prelude, TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 32.
245. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (1990).
246. See id. at 603-04.
247. See id. at 603.
248. See Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 606 (citing 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656).
249. See id. at 604.
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and the corresponding lack of jurisdiction. The district court refused to
dismiss on the claim of outrageous conduct by the United States, but
granted the dismissal on the grounds that the treaty had been violat-
ed.50 The United States appealed and the circuit court of appeals af-
firmed5'
The United States then appealed the matter to the Supreme
Court. 2 The Supreme Court reversed the decision, relying heavily on
the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. 3 Using a strict interpretation of the treaty,
the Court found that the treaty did not specifically prohibit such abduc-
tions 4 and that such a prohibition could not be interpreted into the
treaty155 The decision of the Supreme Court was notable for its fail-
ure to address issues of international law, such as sovereignty.
2. Critique
The first critique of the decision was leveled in the dissent: "most
courts throughout the civilized world will be deeply disturbed by the
'monstrous' decision the Court announces today." 6 Justice Blackmun
publicly criticized the decision." 7 The criticism mounted forcing the
United States to attempt to repair the damage."5 The press crucified
the Supreme Court. 9  Many scholars denounced the decision. 6
There appears to be little question that the abduction violated interna-
tional law.
One author, while acknowledging that international kidnapping
violates international law, suggested that an exception should be made
where the harboring state sponsored the suspect's crimes, such as ter-
250. See id. at 601.
251. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1467 (1991).
252. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
253. See id. at 660-662, 670.
254. See id. at 666.
255. See id. at 667.
256. See id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. See Justice Blaeoanun Addresses ASIL Annual Dinner, in A.S.I.L. NEWSLETTER, Mar.
1994.
258. See, e.g., Alan J. Kreczko, The Alvarez-Machain Decision, 3 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
DISPATCH 614 (Aug. 3, 1992).
259. See, e.g., Court Rules U.S. Can Kidnap Suspects From Other Nations, ATLANTA J. AND
CONST., Jun. 16, 1992, at A8.
260. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, International Kidnapping: State Sponsored Abduction: A
Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746 (1992); see also Halle
Fine Terrion, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Supreme Court Sanctions Governmentally
Orchestrated Abductions As Means To Obtain Personal Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
625 (1993); see also Jonathan Gluck, The Customary International Law of State Sponsored
International Abduction and United States Courts, 44 DuKE L.J. 612 (1994).
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rorism."' Obviously such was not the case in Mexico, as terrorism
was not involved.
However, the criticism was not unanimous. For example, one
scholar attempted to defend the decision on the grounds that the deci-
sion was not whether abductions were legal, but whether denying juris-
diction was proper.262 Unfortunately, this argument appears to ignore
the "legitimizing" effect the decision had upon such future abductions.
IV. COMMENTARY
A. Purposes For the New World Order
One academic presents two justifications for a New World Order:
(1) the problem of an expanding population and (2) the problem of di-
minishing natural resources.263 Although this article was written in the
late 1970s, today, few people would dispute the accuracy of his claims.
But these claims do not comport with the reasons offered by the United
States for its actions, as previously discussed.
Clearly, employing the Monroe-Brezhnev Doctrine would not be an
appropriate manner of addressing these idealistic concerns. Thus, the
actions of the United States betray underlying purposes. But these pur-
poses are not difficult to discern. As Presidents Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton have announced, the "encouragement" of democracy was, at
least in part, justification for the actions in Central America. But what
other political specters haunt these decisions?
B. The American Vision: Theory & Practice
President Bush's announcement of a New World Order was "world
where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle .... [a] world
where the strong respect the rights of the weak."26 This statement,
prima facie, appears to be highly idealistic. But its implicit corollary, in
practical terms, is not; meaning that only when the weak adhere to the
policies and politics of the United States will they be protected.
Henry Kissinger criticized the American idealism of a New World
Order and noted "the new world order cannot be built to American
specifications." '26 Scholars have followed that view, stating for any
New World Order to be successful, the United States, itself, must first
261. See Scott S. Evans, International Kidnapping in a Violent World: Where the United
States Ought to Draw the Line, 137 Ma. L. RIv. 187 (1992).
262. See Malvina Halberstam, International Kidnapping: In Defense of the Supreme Court
Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1992).
263. ROBERT COOLEY ANGELL, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER 1-2 (1979).
264. See Curtius, supra note 2, at 14.
265. See Henry Kissinger, False Dreams of a New World Order, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,
1991, at A21.
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comply with international law.' Thus, the leadership of the United
States is essential, given its economic and military power27 Although
some call for strong United States leadership, this "leadership" may
have to be tempered. As one commentator stated: the United States may
have to relinquish its role of dominating certain international organiza-
tions."
The United States attitude on sovereignty was made remarkably
apparent by President Reagan's comment concerning the Israeli raid in
Tunisia in 1985 as a "legitimate response" and "understandable," even
though the raid violated the sovereignty of another nation, and the
United Nations Security Council condemned it by a vote of 14-0. 2' It
should be noted that President Reagan subsequently modified his state-
ment. A writer has asked, what would the response of the United States
be if Nicaragua bombed the White House to punish those who were
responsible for the mining of its harbors?27 Further, others ask what
would the United States response be if Mexico kidnapped and tried the
DEA agents who were responsible for the kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain? Indeed, a number of authorities note that the United States,
when exporting its jurisdiction, must also export its substantive law of
civil and human rights.27" '
One scholar notes that intervention in the affairs of minor powers
does not enhance the national security of the United States, as they
pose no threat to American security. 2 So why does the United States
insist on invading such minor powers as Grenada, Haiti, and Panama
and use the reason of national security as justification?
The situations presented in this article all have common themes:
(1) a disregard for the sovereignty of less powerful nations (most cer-
tainly the United States would never have attempted any of these ac-
tions against the Soviet Union); (2) the placement of United States
interests over those of other nations (even where the United States
266. See, e.g., John Quigley, The New World Order and the Rule of Law, 18 SYRACUSE 1.
INT'L L. & COM. 75, 76 (1992).
267. See Zbigniew Brezinski, Order, Disorder, and U.S. Leadership, 15 WASH. QUARTERLY
2 (1992).
268. See, e.g., David Brinkley, The World For the OAS, 50 Years of Irrelevancy May Be
Over, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at 2 (examining United States domination of the Organization
of American States).
269. See Joseph Harsch, Mr. Reagan's Response to the Tunisia Raid, THE CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Oct. 8, 1985, at 15.
270. See id.
271. See generally John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, The Uneven, but Growing, Role of
International Law in RETHINKING AMERICA'S SECURITY 279 (Graham Allison & Gregory
Treverton eds., 1992).
272. See John J. Mearsheimer, Disorder Restored in RETHINKING AMERICA'S SEcURrrY 236
(Graham Allison & Gregory Treverton eds., 1992).
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interest (e.g., a suspected murderer or kidnapper) is comparatively mi-
nor to the foreign interests (e.g., territorial sovereignty)); and (3) the
advancement of United States "democratic" politics in other nations,
despite the internationally recognized mandates of national self-determi-
nation and sovereignty. Each of these three common themes violates
every traditional notion of international law and sovereign equality. In
each situation, the United States exercised its power despite prohibitions
in international law.
One prominent international law professor demonstrated that the
United States was actually substituting power for authority,273 authori-
ty being the mandate granted by recognized law. Thus, argued the pro-
fessor, if the United States continues to rely on its power, substituting
fear for respect, the United States may very well suffer the fate of
Athens when it did the same, e.g. conquered by Sparta. However, as
long as the United States is the sole superpower, this fear most likely
will not be realized.
If the United States were to recognize the authority of international
law (e.g., accept jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, even
when it may lose) and relinquish some of its power, there may be an
advancement towards an idealized New World Order. But, the question
remains, even if an idealized New World Order is the goal, would the
United States be willing to relinquish some of its power to an interna-
tional police force? 74 Probably not.
As one commentator stated: "Chances are that the new world order
will only last until the first time it interferes with some U.S. crusade.
International law? Peace and security? Universal aspirations? Screw
those. We're Americans. We're supposed to get our way."275 More
than one critic considers the New World Order to just be an expression
of American interests in a politically acceptable format.276 But what
are the American interests or the American way?
Is it, as Grover Cleveland once said, that the business of America
is business? The New World Order, in the minds of some, is just anoth-
er way to legitimize the rise of the corporation and the fall of the na-
tion-state.277 Thus, the transnational corporations could very well be
the true interested parties, and not the United States. But to accept this
273. See Alfred P. Rubin, Nicaragua, the World Court, and the U.S., THE CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, July 15, 1986, at 13.
274. See David C. Morrison, Make Peace-or Else, 24 THE NAT'L J. 2250 (Oct. 3, 1992).
275. See Chapman, supra note 168.
276. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, The Lonely Superpower: How To Bear America's New
World Burden, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 29, 1991, at 23
277. See Viven A. Schmidt, The New World Order, Incorporated; The Rise of Business and
the Decline of the Nation-State, DAEDALUS, Mar. 22, 1995, at 75.
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thesis would lend credibility to the claims of the far right and the far
left, which would never be accepted in polite academia.
Numerous authors acknowledge American national security inter-
ests have undergone a change in recent years. More than one author has
claimed that the primary interest of America is economic strength.'
The rationale for such a position is that once economic power is lost,
military strength will falter.
At least two authorities link the economic competitiveness of the
United States with the security of the nation. 79 These authors present
the very distinct possibility that the current evolution of the intemation-
al system may give rise to new, unascertained threats to American
national security and that the new international system may not be
friendly to American interests. But does the United States have the right
to maintain the status quo in the face of changes wrought upon the
international economy by a numerical, but obviously not military, ma-
jority of the world?
Whatever explanation the reader accepts, there is no dispute that
there is a conflict between the "New World Order" and the traditional
notions of sovereignty, as guaranteed by the United Nations Char-
ter."o Thus, it appears that for this idealized New World Order to
exist, there will have to be changes to the traditional notion of sover-
eignty. However, if this New World Order is not so idealistic, then no
changes will be needed at all. As demonstrated by the United States in
each of the situations presented in this paper, all that is needed is a
competent public relations staff and a position as the sole global super-
power.
Even if the goal was the idealistic version, it is unlikely that any
nation, to include the United States, would relinquish a primary position
of global military and economic power. One American Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy has advocated the preservation of the "unique
international role" of the United States militarily." Such a position is
surely not advanced from international altruism. Perhaps, as a balancing
force, the Soviet Union was a force for "good" in the development of
"true" international law.
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C. Problems for the United States
No matter what the rationales for or goals of the actions of the
United States, its posture will make implementation difficult. One au-
thor notes that the chief obstacle to implementing any form of world
order is nationalism?.
2
The actions of the United States have been focused on the interests
of the United States (i.e., American nationalism). Although the United
States has offered claimed international ideals, too often, under public
scrutiny, such claims have become illusory. Thus, any "New World
Order" which the United States is trying to impose, whatever its form
or purpose, will be difficult to implement, at least until the United
States presents greater respect for the sovereignty of other nations and
international law.
V. THE FtrURE
The past and present are relatively clear. The Monroe-Brezhnev
Doctrine has been and is, quite evidently, alive and well in the United
States. But does this mean that the President and the Secretary of State
now qualify as Machiavellian Princes of Darkness? I hope not. In the
world of "realpolitik" there will always be the necessity of taking cer-
tain actions where the conscience of the nation would be shocked.
But, the United States must be extremely careful. As one author
has so accurately acknowledged, if the United States continues to rely
on its military power, with its corresponding disregard for sovereignty,
then the "fundamental maxims of American policy [will change] 'from
liberty to force."' 3 Such a change may not trouble politicians in the
short term, but what will the effect be in the long term?
Will the United States be able to draw Excalibur from the stone,
assume the seat on the Siege Perilous, and bring to the world King
Arthur's justice? Probably not. For as long as the United States holds
the position of sole superpower; the American position can be best
summed up by the comment of that great American philosopher, Alfred
E. Newman: "What, me worry? 2
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